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In this Article, we offer an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between liability waivers signed by parents and 
participation rates in youth sports. Specifically, we explore 
whether waiver enforcement is statistically associated with 
increased participation in youth sports. Our study finds no 
significant evidence of such a relationship. 
The impetus for this investigation comes from an 
experience shared by parents all over the United States. A parent 
enrolls his minor child in a sports activity like a school team, club 
sport, skating party, or tennis camp. Organizers condition the 
child’s participation on the parent signing a liability waiver in the 
organizers’ favor, which often looks like this:  
 
On behalf of myself and my child, I hereby 
assume all risks related to participation in the 
Academy . . . I further hereby, on behalf of 
myself, my child and anyone claiming through 
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myself or my child, do FOREVER RELEASE 
[provider’s name redacted], its [employees, 
officers, and volunteers] from any cause of 
action, claims, or demands of any nature 
whatsoever, including but not limited to a claim 
of negligence which I, my child, or anyone 
claiming through myself or my child, may now or 
in the future have … howsoever the injury is 
caused.1  
 
 Legally, doctrinal reasons exist to doubt the enforceability 
of these releases. They are contracts of adhesion, and allowing 
those responsible for children’s safety to disclaim duty to 
discharge those responsibilities reasonably is possibly 
unconscionable or against public policy.2 Removing negligence 
liability presumably lowers youth sports providers’ incentives to 
take safety precautions, thereby raising the likelihood youths will 
suffer sports-related injuries.  
Despite these concerns, many courts enforce youth sports 
releases.3 Although these decisions could be justified on grounds 
of parental autonomy and freedom of contract, the primary 
argument favoring enforcement asserts that youth sports releases 
serve minors’ interests, even at the cost of greater uncompensated 
                                                                                             
1 Actual release signed by Author Yen on behalf of his son for 
participation in a soccer camp. Copy on file with Author Yen. 
2 See State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 273 (W. 
Va. 2002) (adhesion contracts include all form contracts offered by one 
party on an all-or-nothing basis); Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 
489 (Mont. 2009) (adhesion contract is a form contract to be signed by a 
weaker party with little choice about the terms); see infra Part I; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981) 
(explaining a contractual term is unenforceable on public policy grounds 
when public policy outweighs interest in enforcement); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (explaining an 
unconscionable contract or term may be unenforceable); Delta Funding 
Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 110-111 (N.J. 2006) (finding factors 
determining enforceability of an adhesion contract include 
unconscionability and public policy); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 
P.2d 165, 173 (Cal. 1998) (holding courts will deny enforcement of 
unconscionable adhesion contracts). 
3 See infra Part I. 
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injury. Without enforceable waivers,4 youth sports providers may 
reduce their offerings or go out of business to avoid tort liability 
risks. Conversely, allowing youth sports providers to avoid 
liability increases youth sports opportunities, and youth sports 
participation by extension, which confers benefits on youths 
outweighing any increased risk of uncompensated injury.5 
 This policy argument might be right. However, it is 
plausible only if youth sports participation increases when courts 
enforce exculpatory agreements signed by parents. However, no 
prior study has tested whether enforcing youth sports releases has 
the hypothesized effect. The study described here therefore 
provides valuable information about the persuasiveness of 
arguments on either side of a split in contract and tort law.  
 We conducted our study by applying a linear mixed 
effects regression analysis6 to a dataset containing information 
about high school sports participation rates and the fifty states’ 
law including the District of Columbia from 1988-2014. This 
allowed us to test for an association between enforcing youth 
sports releases and high school sports participation rates. Our 
analysis uncovered no statistically significant association.7 This 
                                                                                             
4 See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205-07 
(Ohio 1998) (mentioning concern for parental authority and freedom of 
contract to support decision enforcing youth sports release). 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 Regression analysis permits the study of a data set to see if the 
value of one aspect of the data (sometimes called a predictor or 
independent variable) can be used to predict the value of another 
(sometimes called the response or dependent variable). See Douglas S. 
Shafer and Zhiyi Zhang, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS Ch. 10 (2012), 
available at https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/135. A 
linear mixed effects regression analysis is one designed to accommodate 
challenges arising when variations in the dependent variable are 
explained by both the independent variable and random effects. See 
Adrzej Galecki & Tomasz Buzykowski, Linear Mixed Effect Models 
Using R: A Step-by-Step Approach, SPRINGER NAT. (2013); Tony Pistilli, 
Using Mixed-Effects Models for Linear Regression, available at 
https://towardsdatascience.com/using-mixed-effects-models-for-linear-
regression-7b7941d249b; Section Week 8—Linear Mixed Models, 
available at https://web.stanford.edu/class/psych252/section/Mixed
_models_tutorial.html. 
7 See infra Part IIB. Enforcing states experienced marginally 
higher participation rates than states with no law on point (generally less 
than 1%), nonenforcing states experienced marginally lower 
participation rates than states with no law on point (generally less than 
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implies that the major argument given by courts for enforcing 
youth sports releases lacks empirical support.  
 The Article proceeds in five parts. First, the Article 
describes the law governing enforceability of youth sports signed 
by parents on behalf of children. Second, the Article sets forth the 
data and methodology on which our empirical study is based. This 
includes discussion about how ambiguities in state law complicate 
studying the association between enforcing youth sports releases 
and high school sports participation. Third, the Article 
acknowledges possible study limitations. Fourth, the Article 
discusses the study’s results and possible implications. Finally, the 
Article concludes with thoughts about how courts should react to 
this study. 
 
I.  STATE LAW CONCERNING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
SPORTS LIABILITY WAIVERS SIGNED BY PARENTS ON 
BEHALF OF CHILDREN 
 
State law varies considerably regarding the enforcement 
of youth sports releases signed by parents. Although state law is 
nuanced, the enforceability of youth sports releases generally 
depends on a state’s specific pronouncements and, to a lesser 
extent, the state’s law about releases signed by adults. 
Most states enforce sports liability waivers signed by adults.8 
Injured parties have often argued these waivers violate public 
policy, but courts have generally rejected these challenges by 
distinguishing essential services like medical services and public 
transportation from optional sports and recreational activities. 
Because people cannot afford to reject essential services, courts 
believe that allowing providers to disclaim liability is unfair, 
especially when removing the threat of tort liability might 
compromise public safety. By contrast, people can easily decide 
                                                                                             
1%), and enforcing states experienced marginally higher participation 
rates than nonenforcing states did (generally less than 1.5%).  
8 See, e.g., Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 926 
(Minn. 1982) (exculpatory clause in favor of gym and health spa 
provider not against public interest and therefore enforceable); 
Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1175 (Pa. 2010) 
(enforcing release in favor of ski operator); Stelluti v. Casapenn Enter., 
LLC, 1 A.3d 678, 695 (N.J. 2010) (enforcing release on behalf of fitness 
center).  
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not to play sports. Accordingly, it is arguably fair to give people a 
choice about absolving sports providers of liability as a condition 
of sports participation. 9  This explains why courts generally 
enforce sports liability waivers signed by adults when those 
waivers demonstrate a clear intent to waive the provider’s 
negligence. However, courts will not typically recognize waivers 
of gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional behavior.10 
 The general enforceability of adult sports liability waivers 
does not necessarily mean that state courts treat waivers signed by 
parents on behalf of minor children the same way. At the 
beginning of the study period in 1988, forty-two of the fifty-one 
states surveyed had no clear position on the enforceability of 
                                                                                             
9 See Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1963). Tunkl is a leading opinion in which the California Supreme Court 
refused to enforce an exculpatory agreement favoring a hospital. The 
court began with the premise, “[N]o public policy opposes private, 
voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to 
shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the 
other party.” Id. at 101. However, the court then distinguished the case 
from ordinary cases because the agreement (one for medical care) was 
one “affecting the public interest.” Id. Exculpatory agreements affecting 
the public interest violate public policy because they frequently involve 
essential services like healthcare. Individuals unfairly face coercion 
when providers predicate essential services on waivers of liability, 
making enforcement of such bargains inappropriate. Id. See also 
Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996) (holding a 
preinjury agreement releasing medical researcher for negligent conduct 
violates public policy). For cases distinguishing recreational sports from 
essential services, see Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 128 
Cal.Rptr.2d 885, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“California courts have 
consistently declined to apply Tunkl and invalidate exculpatory 
agreements in the recreational sports context.”); Chepkevich v. Hidden 
Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1191 (Pa. 2010) (enforcing release in 
favor of ski operator because skiing is a “voluntary recreational 
activity”); Stelluti v. Casapenn Ents, Enterprises, LLC, 1 A.3d 678 (N.J. 
2010) (enforcing release on behalf of fitness center). However, at least 
one state does not enforce exculpatory agreements at all. See Hanks v. 
Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 744-47 (Conn. 2005) 
(concluding exculpatory agreement in favor of ski area affects public 
interest and is unenforceable). 
10  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 195(1) (AM. L. INST. 
1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused 
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy.”).  
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youth sports releases, seven would not enforce them, and two had 
laws suggesting nonenforcement.11 No state had laws suggesting 
or establishing enforcement. By the end of the study period in 
2014, thirteen states did not enforce youth sports releases, six 
suggested nonenforcement, three suggested enforcement, eight 
enforced youth sports releases, and twenty-one had no clear law 
on the issue. Not surprisingly, state courts express sharply 
contrasting views about the law. 
Courts refusing to enforce youth sports releases generally 
emphasize protecting minors, elevating their safety and 
compensation for injury over other policy goals. In the leading 
case Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, a twelve-year-old boy 
suffered severe head injuries while skiing at a commercial ski 
resort.12 He lost control while skiing on a race course laid out by 
the resort’s ski school and apparently slid into a shack near the 
race course.13 When the boy sued the ski resort and the school, the 
defendants claimed a release signed by the boy’s mother had 
absolved the defendants of responsibility.14 That release contained 
the following language: 
 
For and in consideration of the instruction of 
skiing, I hereby hold harmless Grayson Connor, 
and the Grayson Connor Ski School and any 
instructor or chaperon from all claims arising out 
of the instruction of skiing or in transit to or from 
the ski area. I accept full responsibility for the 
cost of treatment for any injury suffered while 
taking part in the program.15 
 
After concluding that the release was clear enough to give notice 
of an intended waiver, the Washington Supreme Court discussed 
the public policy implications of enforcing it. 16  The court 
recognized that Washington generally enforced such exculpatory 
                                                                                             
11  For purposes of this article, the authors will refer to the 
District of Columbia as a state. 
12  Scott v. Pac. West Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 
1992). 
13 Id. at 8. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 9. 
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agreements, but emphasized that waivers signed by parents on 
behalf of minors required special consideration. 17  In many 
jurisdictions, parents do not have the general authority to release 
their children’s causes of action.18 In Washington, parents could 
not settle a child’s claim without a hearing and court approval.19 
The court worried that enforcing youth sports waivers might 
deprive a child of recourse against a negligent party to pay for care 
his or her parents could not afford. 20  Accordingly, the court 
rejected the argument the threat of liability would raise the cost of 
sports, finding no sufficient justification for allowing sports 
providers to absolve themselves of liability as a condition to sports 
participation.21  
 By contrast, courts enforcing youth sports releases often 
contend that negligence claims pose grave risks to the viability of 
youth sports. Allowing youth sport providers to absolve 
themselves of liability therefore increases the availability of youth 
sports. This argument implicitly assumes that the value of 
increased youth sports opportunities outweighs any risks of 
uncompensated injury accompanying youth sports releases.  
The leading case Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club expresses this 
position.22 In Zivich, the seven-year-old plaintiff suffered injury 
when climbing on a soccer goal after practice.23 The plaintiff’s 
mother had signed a waiver in the defendant’s favor, and the 
district court relied on the waiver to grant summary judgment 
against the plaintiff.24 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court looked 
past the waiver’s potential effects on child safety, focusing instead 
on tort liability’s potential effect on individuals and institutions 
providing youth sports opportunities: 
 
[F]aced with the very real threat of a lawsuit, and 
the potential for substantial damage awards, 
nonprofit organizations and their volunteers 
could very well decide that the risks are not worth 
the effort. Hence, invalidation of exculpatory 
                                                                                             
17 Id. at 11. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 11—12. 
21 Id. at 12. 
22 Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998). 
23 Id. at 203. 
24 Id. at 203—04. 
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agreements would reduce the number of activities 
made possible through the uncompensated 
services of volunteers and their sponsoring 
organizations. … Accordingly, we believe that 
public policy justifies giving parents authority to 
enter into these types of binding agreements on 
behalf of their minor children.25 
 
This led the court to hold that waivers of the sort signed by the 
plaintiff’s mother were valid, and the court upheld the lower 
court’s ruling.26 
 Other courts enforcing youth sports releases follow the 
reasoning expressed in Zivich, extending it for the benefit of 
public schools. In Sharon v. City of Newton, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court wrote, “[t]o hold that releases of the type 
in question here are unenforceable would expose public schools, 
who offer many of the extracurricular sports opportunities 
available to children, to financial costs and risks that will 
inevitably lead to the reduction of those programs.”27  And, in 
Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District, the California Fourth 
District Court of Appeals wrote:  
 
Hohe, like thousands of children participating in 
recreational activities sponsored by groups of 
volunteers and parents, was asked to give up her 
right to sue. The public as a whole receives the 
benefit of such waivers so that groups such as 
Boy and Girl Scouts, Little League, and parent-
teacher associations are able to continue without 
the risks and sometimes overwhelming costs of 
litigation. Thousands of children benefit from the 
availability of recreational and sports activities. 
Those options are steadily decreasing-victims of 
decreasing financial and tax support for other 
than the bare essentials of an education. Every 
learning experience involves risk. In this instance 
                                                                                             
25 Id. at 205. 
26 Id. at 208. 
27 Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Mass. 2002). 
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Hohe agreed to shoulder the risk. No public 
policy forbids the shifting of that burden.28 
II.  TESTING THE EFFECT OF YOUTH SPORTS LIABILITY 
WAIVERS 
  
The foregoing shows that an empirically testable 
proposition heavily influences the enforceability of youth sports 
releases. Put simply, courts enforcing those releases believe that 
doing so increases youth sports participation. We now describe 
how we tested this proposition. 
 
A.  CONSTRUCTION OF DATASET  
 
1.  BASIC CONSTRUCTION 
  
We used three sources to construct the dataset used to test 
the relationship between enforcing youth sports releases and youth 
sports participation rates. First, we took participation figures 
compiled and reported annually by the National Federation of 
State High School Associations (NFHS).29 The NFHS annually 
surveys its membership, state high school athletic associations for 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia, to gather the number 
of high school students who participate in sports in each state.30 
By relying on NFHS data, we have reconstructed total 
participation numbers in each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia for a twenty-seven-year period from 1988 to 2014. 
These numbers include participation by gender. 
                                                                                             
28 Id. at 1565. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal. 
App. 3d 1559, 1564 (Ct. App. 1990). 
29 Although “NFHS” is not a perfect acronym for “National 
Federation of State High School Associations,” it is the commonly used 
acronym for the organization. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE 
HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, https://www.nfhs.org/who-we-
are/aboutus (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
30  High School Participation Survey Archive, NATIONAL 
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Second, we used high school enrollment figures obtained 
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).31 The 
NCES provides secondary school enrollment by state for all years 
under study. Accordingly, one can approximate the high school 
sports participation rate for each state in any year by taking the 
NFHS raw number and dividing it by the high school enrollment 
figure provided by the NCES. 
 Third, we compiled data derived from surveying the law 
of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. This required 
examining each jurisdiction to determine if the jurisdiction 
enforced, had not enforced, or had decided nothing about youth 
sports waivers from 1988 to 2014. For each year, each state was 
assigned one of the following codes, depending on the state of its 
law governing the enforceability of youth sports waivers signed 
by parents in the high school sports context: 
 
-2: Youth sports waivers unenforceable. 
-1: Law indicating that youth sports waivers would 
be invalid, but no definitive ruling. 
 0: No case or statutory law on point, or law so 
confusing that no conclusions can fairly be 
made. 
 1: Indication that youth sports waivers would be 
enforced, but no definitive ruling. 
 2: Youth sports waivers enforceable. 
  
2.  CRITERIA AND PROCESS FOR CODING OF STATE LAW 
 
Setting the criteria for and assigning the codes for each 
state required nuanced judgments about the meaning of state law. 
We next describe the criteria used and the process for applying 
them.32 
For a state to be coded -2 or 2, we required clear state law 
about the enforceability of youth sports releases favoring high 
schools. Although state supreme courts sometimes provided 
                                                                                             
31 Public school enrollment in grades 9 through 12, by region, 
state, and jurisdiction: Selected years, fall 1990 through fall 2027, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS (Jan. 2018), https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_203.30.asp. 
32 A summary of the relevant law from all 50 states can be found 
in the Appendix to this article. 
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definitive rulings, we did not condition a -2 or 2 coding on a state 
supreme court ruling.33 In a few cases, state legislatures settled the 
question.34 In others, we accepted trial or intermediate appellate 
state court opinions on point because we believed such rulings 
would establish the law in a state until contradicted or overruled. 
We did not accept federal court opinions about state law on the 
grounds such opinions are predictions, not pronouncements, of 
state law. 
 -1 or 1 codings often followed nonbinding or unclear state 
law. Federal court decisions pronouncing state law and 
unpublished state court opinions received this treatment because 
these cases do not set binding precedent for future state court 
decisions. We also assigned -1 or 1 when decisions suggested 
outcomes without clearly deciding whether to enforce releases 
favoring high schools. 
 This ambiguity sometimes arose because courts 
sometimes make distinctions between for-profit entities and 
nonprofit or government entities like schools. In Zivich, the Ohio 
Supreme Court justified its decision in part by invoking the image 
of impecunious nonprofits who would be driven from providing 
youth sports opportunities by the fear of negligence liability.35 
This image arguably distinguishes nonprofits and government 
entities from for-profit entities. On the one hand, nonprofits and 
government actors, like schools, arguably provide youth sports for 
the public good. These entities might lack resources for damages 
or insurance because they do not seek or generate sufficient profit. 
Giving these entities a break from liability might therefore seem 
fair given their altruistic motives. On the other hand, for-profit 
entities provide youth sports to make money. They therefore earn 
enough revenue to pay for insurance, and their monetary 
motivations make them less deserving of relief from liability.  
 Although many reasons exist to doubt whether the 
distinction between non-profit/government and for-profit actors is 
                                                                                             
33 See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.W.2d 201 (Ohio 
1998); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002); Hanks 
v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005). 
34  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-22-107(3) (West) (“A 
parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child's 
prospective claim for negligence.”); Alaska Stat. Ann. §09.65.292 
(2004) (West). 
35 Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205. 
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indeed valid,36 some courts accept it. Accordingly, these courts 
raise the possibility that they would enforce releases favoring 
nonprofit and government entities, but not those favoring for-
profit entities. This means that decisions against enforcing youth 
sports releases must be read carefully when the defendant is a for-
profit entity.37 In some cases, an opinion indicates that the court 
would not enforce releases regardless of the entity involved 
because parents simply lack the power to bind their children to 
youth sports releases.38 In other cases, an opinion leaves open the 
                                                                                             
36 The primary reason to doubt this distinction is that many 
nonprofits have resources comparable to for-profit entities. At the high 
end of the scale, U.S. Soccer is a 501(c)(3) corporation, with cash assets 
of over $14 million and net assets of over $145 million. See U.S. SOCCER, 
https://www.developmentfund.ussoccer.com/#homepage (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2020) (“U.S. Soccer is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.”); 
2019 Audited Financial statement of U.S. Soccer, available at Financial 
Information, U.S. SOCCER, https://www.ussoccer.com/governance/
financial-information (last visited Sept. 26th, 2020). Smaller youth sports 
clubs may be organized as nonprofit entities, but they mimic for-profits’ 
behavior by charging significant fees to sports participants. Indeed, the 
Zivich defendant, Mentor Soccer Club, presently charges over $900 for 
participants aged nine to fifteen. See 2017-18 Program Fees, MENTOR 
SOCCER CLUB, https://www.mentorsoccerclub.com/Default.aspx?tabid
=31518 (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). And, in 2017, USA Today reported 
annual club fees (not including travel) of $2,500 to $5,000 for club soccer 
and up to $6,000 for volleyball. See Paying to Play: How Much do Club 
Sports Cost?, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2017), https://usatodayhss.
com/2017/paying-to-play-how-much-do-club-sports-cost. At the very 
least, these assets and revenue streams make many nonprofits fully able 
to purchase liability insurance. See Youth Tackle Football Insurance, 
Sadler Sports and Recreation Insurance, https://www.sadlersports.com/
football/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (quoting tackle football insurance 
for under $500 per team with coverage offered in all 50 states). See also 
ESPORTSINSURANCE, https://www.esportsinsurance.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2020). Similarly, public school systems do not lack money and 
are fully able and do carry liability insurance.  
37 Decisions to enforce such releases do not present problems 
because nonprofit and government entities are considered more 
deserving of liability relief than for-profit entities. Therefore, a decision 
to enforce a release for a commercial entity surely means they would be 
enforced on behalf of nonprofits and government entities as well.  
38 See Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1063-64 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
2001), (“a parent has [no] authority to release a child's cause of action 
prior to an injury."); Scott v. Pac. W. Mt. Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 
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possibility that a court would refuse to enforce youth sports 
releases only when the defendant is a for-profit entity.  
For example, in Kirton v. Fields,39 the Florida Supreme 
Court refused to enforce a release executed in favor of a 
commercial entity.40 Such a decision might have indicated a -2 
coding, but the court carefully phrased its opinion as applying only 
to “injuries resulting from participation in a commercial 
activity.”41 In so ruling, the court let stand the earlier case of case 
of Gonzalez v. City of Coral Gables,42 in which the Third District 
Court of Appeals enforced a youth sports release in favor of a fire 
department youth program operated by the City of Coral Gables.43 
In so deciding, the court characterized the youth program as 
“within the category of commonplace child oriented community 
or school supported activities for which a parent or guardian may 
waive his or her child's litigation rights in authorizing the child's 
participation.”44 This left open the possibility that the court might 
decide differently if the release favored a government or non-
profit entity, so we coded Florida as 1.45  
Similarly, in Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,46 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court considered a release signed by a parent 
favoring a commercial skate park. 47  In ruling against 
enforceability, the court framed the issue narrowly, asking 
“whether New Jersey's public policy permits a parent to release a 
minor child's potential tort claims arising out of the minor's use of 
                                                                                             
1992) (en banc) (“We hold that to the extent a parent's release of a third 
party's liability for negligence purports to bar a child's own cause of 
action, it violates public policy and is unenforceable.”); Galloway v. 
State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Iowa 2010) (“[P]reinjury releases executed 
by parents purporting to waive the personal injury claims of their minor 
children violate public policy and are therefore unenforceable.”). 
39 997 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2008). 
40 Id. at 358. 
41 Id. 
42 871 So.2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 We recognized that we might be wrong about how opinions 
like Kirton would be understood by relevant actors and that future cases 
might come out differently. We therefore treated codings of 1 and -1 in 
different ways to see if our results were sensitive to alternate coding 
decisions. We found no such sensitivity. See infra Part IIB. 
46 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006). 
47 Id. at 383. 
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a commercial recreational facility.”48 However, we coded New 
Jersey as a -1, as opposed to 0, in the wake of Hojnowski because 
an earlier 1970 trial court decision had found a release signed by 
a parent void against public policy.49 Because that case made no 
distinction between for-profit and nonprofit or government 
entities, we read that case as justifying a -2 code. Hojnowski 
therefore represented a possible, but by no means definite, 
retrenchment from earlier law. 
 0 codings generally applied to states whose case and 
statutory law was silent on the youth sports release issue. 
However, we also assigned 0 to states with relevant, but 
confusing, law. For example, in Connecticut, from 1958 until 
2002, the primary precedent regarding youth sports releases was 
Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc.50  In 
Fedor, the Connecticut Superior Court held a release signed by 
the plaintiff’s father as a condition of attending a boy scout camp 
void as against public policy. We coded Connecticut as -2 
accordingly. Then, in 2002 and 2003, the Connecticut Superior 
Court issued two unpublished opinions enforcing releases signed 
by the plaintiffs’ parents.51 If these opinions had been published, 
they would have justified a 2 coding. However, we could not 
predict these cases’ effects because the relevant opinions were 
unpublished, so we coded Connecticut as 0. Interestingly, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held all exculpatory agreements 
unenforceable for public policy reasons in 2005, suggesting that 
we were correct about the unpublished opinions’ weak 
precedential effect.52 
Similarly, in 1997, Hawaii enacted Hawaii Revised 
Statutes 663-1.54(b) to address the general enforceability of 
releases.53 The statute states: 
                                                                                             
48 Id. at 385 (emphasis added). 
49 Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). 
50 Fedor v. Manuwhu Council, 143 A.2d 466 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1958). 
51 Fischer v. Rivest, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2002) (unpublished); Saccente v. Laflamme, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 174 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (unpublished). 
52 Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 
741—42 (Conn. 2005). 
53 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54(b) (1997). 
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owners and operators of recreational activities 
shall not be liable for damages for injuries to a 
patron resulting from inherent risks associated 
with the recreational activity if the patron 
participating in the recreational activity 
voluntarily signs a written release waiving the 
owner or operator's liability for damages for 
injuries resulting from the inherent risks.54  
 
Importantly, however, “inherent risks” do not include those 
resulting “from the negligence, gross negligence, or wanton act or 
omission” of the defendant.55  
It is hard to know how a statute like this might affect the 
law going forward, and Hawaii has reported no case clarifying the 
matter. First, the statute protects “owners and operators of 
recreational activities” without elaborating on whether a high 
school falls within “owners and operators.”56 Second, the statute 
excludes risks arising from the defendant’s negligence. 57  This 
exclusion arguably reduces a release’s value to practically nothing 
because defendants do not face liability for injuries not caused by 
negligence. However, risks inherent to a sport can be caused, or 
exacerbated, by a defendant’s negligence. For example, drowning 
is a risk inherent in surfing, but a surfing school can reduce 
drowning risks by taking reasonable precautions when taking 
students to the ocean. If a surfing student signs a liability waiver 
but drowns, does the release protect the defendant because 
drowning is an inherent risk of surfing? Or, does the release not 
protect the defendant if the plaintiff alleges the defendant failed to 
take reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of drowning? 
Finally, it is not clear whether a parent’s signature on a youth 
sports release would count as one voluntarily signed by the patron. 
These ambiguities made predicting how Hawaii courts might treat 
youth sports releases impossible, so we coded the state as 0. 
 
 
                                                                                             
54 Id. 
55 HAW. REV. STAT. 663-1.54(c)(3) (1997). 
56 Id. § 663-1.54(b). 
57 Id. § 663-1.54(c)(3). 
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3.  CALCULATING HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS PARTICIPATION 
RATES 
 
We derived state high school sports participation rates 
from two sources covering 1988 through 2014: (1) the National 
Federation of State High Schools (NFHS) annual high school 
athletics participation survey58 and (2) the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) Elementary/Secondary Information 
System website. 59  The NFHS writes playing rules and offers 
guidance for high school sports60 and is comprised of state athletic 
associations from all fifty states and the District of Columbia.61 
Each year, the NFHS surveys its member associations about youth 
sports participation and publishes the results on both a national 
and state-by-state basis.62 We used the figures from these surveys 
as the number of youths participating in high school sports for 
each state in a given year, excluding numbers that seemed 
obviously incorrect.  
The most common reason for exclusion was discrepancy 
in a state’s reported data. The NFHS surveys generally offered 
three different sets of numbers: total participation, participation by 
gender, and participation by sport broken down by gender. In most 
cases, those numbers were consistent, with various categories’ 
sums equaling total numbers. In some cases, the sums did not 
match, leading us to doubt the numbers’ accuracy. Therefore, we 
set an arbitrary 0.1% limit as an acceptable discrepancy and 
excluded years with larger discrepancies. 
                                                                                             
58  Available at High School Participation Survey Archive, 
NAT’L FED’N OF HIGH SCHOOL ASS’NS (Aug. 28, 2019), https://
www.nfhs.org/sports-resource-content/high-school-participation-survey
-archive/. 
59  ElSi: Elementary/Secondary Information System, INST. OF 
EDUC. SCI., http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020). We 
downloaded our information by using the ElSi Table Generator at https:
//nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/tableGenerator.aspx. 
60  See About Us. NAT’L FED’N OF HIGH SCHOOL ASS’NS, 
https://www.nfhs.org/who-we-are/aboutus (last visited Sept. 19, 2020). 
61 See id.; State Association Listing, NAT’L FED’N OF HIGH SCH. 
ASS’NS, https://www.nfhs.org/resources/state-association-listing (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2020) (listing all fifty-one NFHS member state 
associations). 
62 NFHS, supra note 30. 
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 Reporting identical results in consecutive years provided 
the next most common reason for exclusion. For example, Georgia 
reported two-year pairs of identical results for 1989 to 1990, 1991 
to 1992, 1993 to 1994, 1995 to 1996, 1999 to 2000, 2008 to 2009, 
and 2010 to 2011. Many other states had similar identical reports, 
both overall or for only one gender. We considered such 
coincidence extremely unlikely and suspect that this data pattern 
reflected clerical error or reuse of a prior year’s figures in the 
absence of a completed survey in a given year. We responded by 
including only one repeating year in our dataset.  
Smaller numbers of exclusions resulted from the removal 
of outliers and other oddities. We removed nine data points 
because the reported numbers varied significantly from the years 
before and after.63 We also removed four years of data from Iowa 
because the numbers indicated participation rates over 100%.64 
We combined the raw participation numbers obtained from the 
NFHS with the NCES enrollment figures. Dividing the NFHS 
numbers by the total secondary school enrollment for each state 
approximated the fraction of high school students in each state 
participating in high school sports. 
 
4.  CONTROLS 
 
We included 3 control variables. First, we controlled for 
year because participation rates unmistakably rise during the 
study, regardless of the law adopted by a given state.65 This trend 
makes comparing observations from different years potentially 
inaccurate. Adjusting for year reduces the possibility of such error 
and was a significant predictor in our model. 
                                                                                             
63 Candidates for such exclusion were initially identified with a 
three standard deviation rule. After, a visual inspection determined 
whether the potential outlier truly varied from the surrounding years. The 
data points removed were West Virginia 2007, Virginia 1990, North 
Dakota 1990, Oregon 1990 and 1999, Montana 2004, New Mexico 2006, 
Alaska 1990, and Arkansas 1991 and 2000. 
64  The removed years are 1989, 1991, 1992, and 2008. 
Participation rates of over 100% could possibly arise if many students in 
a state participated in multiple sports and were counted as separate 
individuals for each participation. We do not know if this happened.  
65 Only 7 states experienced falling participation rates over the 
course of the study: Colorado, Washington, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, 
Oregon, and South Dakota.  
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 Second, we controlled for median household income 
because wealth might affect sports participation rates. To do this, 
we used data reported by the US Census in 2018 dollars.66 This 
control proved a significant predictor in our model. 
Third, we controlled for the ratio of male to female participants to 
isolate the law affecting releases more precisely. Especially in the 
earlier years studied, the number of boys participating in sports far 
exceeded the number of girls. That gap decreased considerably in 
later years of study. The reasons for this decrease probably 
included changing attitudes towards girls’ sports participation and 
Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in 
educational institutions receiving federal funding. 67  We 
hypothesized that states with highly unequal participation would 
respond more strongly to Title IX and increase sports participation 
for girls more rapidly than states with relatively equal 
participation. Controlling for participation differences between 
genders allowed us to avoid confounding effects associated with 
gender, which proved significant. 
                                                                                             
66  Historical Income Tables: Households, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/historical-income-households.html. (last updated Sept. 8, 2020). 
Note also for 2013, two sets of figures were reported, which have been 
combined by the estimated population proportion for the two concurrent 
surveys. Historical Income Tables Footnotes, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income/guidance/cps-
historic-footnotes.html. (last updated Sept. 4, 2020). 
67 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.41(c) (requiring provision of equal athletic opportunity for 
members of both sexes). See also McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. 
School Dist. Of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(applying Title IX to high school sports and noting “[t]he participation 
of girls and women in high school and college sports has increased 
dramatically since Title IX was enacted.”); Ollier v. Sweetwater Union 
High School Dist., 858 F.Supp.2d 1093 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (applying Title 
IX to high school sports). For a description of Title IX’s influence on 
sports, see Dionne Koller, Not Just One of the Boys: a Post-Feminist 
Critique of Title IX’s Vision for Gender Equity in Sports, 43 CONN. L. 
REV. 401 (2010). 
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In addition to the three significant controls mentioned 
above, we initially controlled for state sovereign immunity and 
statutory damages caps because such law potentially obviates the 
value of releases for high schools. Accordingly, we conducted an 
additional fifty state survey to determine each state’s sovereign 
immunity law throughout the study period. We coded and treated 
the results of the survey as a categorical variable in our analysis 
as follows: 
 
 2: No waiver of sovereign immunity 
 1: Partial, limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
-1: Partial, larger waiver of sovereign immunity 
-2: Complete waiver of sovereign immunity 
 
However, we discovered adding sovereign immunity did not give 
us new statistically significant information. Accordingly, we 
followed standard statistical analysis practice and dropped it from 
the model.68 
We controlled for damage caps because states sometimes 
limit the amount a plaintiff may recover in a suit against high 
schools. This required yet another fifty-state survey, which 
resulted in a 1 coding if a state capped damages and 0 if a state did 
not. We decided against trying to code for variations in damage 
caps because differences among the states were subtle and 
numerous. We discovered here as well that adding damage cap 
information to our model did not yield valuable new information, 
so it too was dropped. 
 
B.  ANALYSIS 
 
We used the foregoing data to test the effect of enforcing 
or not enforcing youth sports releases. The study’s null hypothesis 
was that the law governing these releases does not affect youth 
sports participation rates. The study tested this hypothesis by 
measuring the relationship between various legal conditions (i.e., 
whether the state law was -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, or combinations thereof) 
and high school youth sports participation rates. The study 
conducted the analysis with R in a linear mixed effect multilevel 
                                                                                             
68 R. Dennis Cook & Sanford Weisburg, Applied Regression 
Including Computing and Graphics, JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. (2009). 
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model.69 The response variable was the participation rate, and the 
predictors were the code assigned to each state’s law in a given 
year, with one exception. For years in which a state’s law changed, 
we did not assign the new code to the state until the following year 
on the theory it takes time before a population learns about 
changes in the law and adjusts its behavior. 
Because codes -1 and 1 had associated ambiguities, we 
processed data associated with those codes in three different ways. 
In the first, we treated codes -1 and 1 identically to code 0. In the 
second, we excluded that data, including only data linked to state 
law codes -2, 0, or 2. In the third, we treated codes -1 as -2 and 1 
as 2. We were unable to treat -1 and 1 as separate codes because 
the number of such data points was too small to provide statistical 
power.70  
We employed three methods to test how sensitive our 
analysis was to the coding decisions made about state law. By 
treating -1 and 1 codes as 0, we treated ambiguous cases as if they 
told the public nothing about the enforcement of youth sports 
waivers. This made sense because ambiguous signals about the 
enforceability of waivers are not likely to influence the behavior 
of youth sports providers. If a state tells youth sports providers it 
will or will not enforce waivers, those providers have every reason 
to arrange their affairs accordingly. However, if no law or 
ambiguous law exists, the reasons for adjusting behavior are 
smaller. It might make sense to change nothing until further 
clarification arrives. 
By excluding data associated with -1 and 1 codes, we 
treated ambiguous cases as noise indecipherable to the general 
public that therefore ought to be ignored. This is potentially 
valuable not only because we are clear about what is being 
measured, but also because the policy debate about the value of 
enforcing youth sports waivers is expressed in cases that clearly 
decide whether to enforce waivers. Thus, ignoring states whose 
laws do not make a clear choice focuses our study on the precise 
policy dispute raised by the law. 
Finally, by including -1 with -2 and 1 with 2, we covered 
the possibility that the public responded to ambiguous signals 
about enforcement or nonenforcement as if they were clear. We 
                                                                                             
69 Adrzej Galecki & Tomasz Buzykowski, Linear Mixed Effect 
Models Using R: A Step-by-Step Approach, SPRINGER NAT. (2013). 
70 Thomas P. Ryan, Sample Size Determination and Power, 
JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. (2013). 
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are not claiming these possible effects occur. We merely tested all 
possibilities in case they changed the strength of association 
between the enforceability of youth sports releases and youth 
sports participation rates. 
All three data-handling methods indicated no statistically 
significant relationship between the enforceability of youth sports 
releases and high school sports participation rates. The principal 
results follow. 
When codes -1 and 1 are treated as 0, the mean adjusted 
participation rate was 54.02611% in states with no law (i.e., states 
coded as 0). For states not enforcing youth sports releases, the 
participation rate fell to 53.61578%. For states enforcing the 
releases, the participation rate rose to 54.66165%. For the 
difference between states with no law and states not enforcing 
releases, the p value71 was 0.6086. For the difference between 
states with no law and states enforcing releases, the p value was 
0.5068. And, for the difference between states not enforcing 
releases and states enforcing releases, the p value was 0.3877. 
These p values fall short of statistical significance at either a 0.10 








                                                                                             
71 The P value is a measure of how statistically likely a given 
observation (particularly an observation that varies from the null 
hypothesis) is if the null hypothesis is true. If this probability is high, 
statisticians interpret the observation as consistent with the null 
hypothesis. Intuitively, this means it is “no big surprise” to observe 
variances from the null hypothesis of this size. If the probability is small, 
statisticians interpret the observation as evidence (not proof) that the null 
hypothesis is false. Probabilities associated with such interpretation are 
labeled statistically significant. See Stephanie Glen, P-Value in 
Statistical Hypothesis Tests: What is it?, available at 
https://www.statisticshowto.com/p-value/; P Values, available at 
https://www.statsdirect.com/help/basics/p_values.htm; Amy Gallo, A 
Refresher on Statistical Significance, Harvard Business Review, 
February 16, 2016, available at https://hbr.org/2016/02/a-refresher-on-
statistical-significance. For a textbook-style explanation, see Douglas S. 
Shafer and Zhiyi Zhang, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 356-363 (2012), 
available at https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/135. 




(-1 and 1 = 0) 
 
  Change Part % P Value 
No Law as "control"  54.02611   
Not Enforceable -0.41033 53.61578 *0.6086 
Enforceable 0.63554 54.66165 *0.5068 
    
Not Enforceable as 
"control"  53.61578   
Enforceable 1.04586 54.66344 0.3877 
*P-value represents test of difference from No Law as “control 
condition” 
 
When data associated with codes -1 and 1 are excluded, 
the mean adjusted participation rate was 54.32471% in states with 
no law (i.e., states coded as 0). For states not enforcing youth 
sports releases, the participation rate fell to 53.37484%. For states 
enforcing releases, the participation rate rose to 54.91457%. For 
the difference between states with no law and states not enforcing 
releases, the p value was 0.3053. For the difference between states 
with no law and states enforcing releases, the p value was 0.5490. 
And, for the difference between states not enforcing releases and 
states enforcing releases, the p value was 0.2333. These p values 
fall short of statistical significance at either a 0.10 or 0.05 
significance level. Figure 2 summarizes these results. 
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Figure 2  
(-1 and 1 excluded) 
 
 Change Part % P Value 
No Law as "control"  54.32471   
Not Enforceable -0.94987 53.37484 *0.3053 
Enforceable 0.58716 54.91457 *0.5490 
        
Not Enforceable as 
"control"  53.37484   
Enforceable 1.53702 54.91186 0.2333 
* P-value represents test of difference from No Law as “control 
condition” 
 
When codes -1 and 1 are treated as -2 and 2 respectively, 
the mean adjusted participation rate was 53.84683% in states with 
no law (i.e., states coded as 0). For states not enforcing youth 
sports releases, the participation rate rose to 53.93076%. For states 
enforcing the releases, the participation rate rose to 54.97869%. 
For the difference between states with no law and states not 
enforcing releases, the p value was 0.9138. For the difference 
between states with no law and states enforcing releases, the p 
value was 0.1747. And, for the difference between states not 
enforcing releases and states enforcing releases, the p value was 
0.3281. These p values fall short of statistical significance at either 
a 0.10 or 0.05 significance level. Figure 3 summarizes these 
results. 
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Figure 3 
(-1 = -2 and 1 = 2) 
 
  Change Part % P Value 
No Law as "control"  53.84683   
Not Enforceable 0.08393 53.93076 *0.9138 
Enforceable 1.13186 54.97869 *0.1747 
        
Not Enforceable as 
"control"  53.93076   
Enforceable 1.04793 54.97869 0.3271 
* P-value represents test of difference from No Law as “control 
condition” 
 
We also tested for sensitivity to the exclusion of outliers 
and the one-year delay in giving effect to a changed coding about 
a state’s law. To do this, we repeated our analysis without the 
delay but with outliers excluded, with the outliers left in but 
retaining the delay, and without the delay and with outliers left in. 
All reruns found no statistically significant association between 
the enforceability of youth sports releases and high school sports 
participation rates. 
 
III.  LIMITATIONS 
  
The study reported here finds no statistically significant 
relationship between the enforceability of youth sports releases 
and participation rates. Like all studies of this sort, it has 
limitations that should be acknowledged. 
First, the study is observational, making it more prone to 
confounding factors that a tightly controlled experimental study 
might avoid. A hidden factor may exist, masking the effect of 
enforcing youth sports releases on youth sports participation rates. 
Similarly, the study’s observational nature means that we could 
not control the nature and timing of youth sports release law 
changes. For example, state law varies in its details, and our 
grouping states into five coded categories may overlook 
statistically significant distinctions. Similarly, unpredictable 
events may have had consequences that amplified or diminished 
the effect of enforcing youth sports releases. This could happen if 
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a natural and unpredictable calamity like the recent COVID-19 
pandemic caused many families to pull their children from high 
school sports opportunities when they would otherwise likely 
have participated. 
Second, the study relies on data aggregated at the state 
level. A more fine-grained aggregation might uncover an 
overlooked effect in a subset of the statewide population. For 
example, perhaps enforcement of youth sports releases matters 
only to high schools in a few very wealthy communities. Their 
response to the law might get hidden if high schools in other 
communities do not care about whether youth sports releases can 
be enforced. 
It would be ideal to conduct a study avoiding these 
limitations. However, we did not have access to data or methods 
that eliminated the relevant problems. Nevertheless, we still 
believe that our study has value and insight, even as we 
acknowledge its potential shortcomings.  
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
To the extent courts enforce youth sports releases in the 
belief that doing so increases youth sports participation, our study 
suggests that this belief is mistaken. Decisions to enforce youth 
sports releases should therefore be reconsidered and perhaps 
reversed.  
There are, of course, nuances. High schools may appear 
indifferent to changes in the law concerning youth sports releases 
for two different reasons. First, high schools may not consider the 
threat of tort liability significant when deciding how extensive a 
sports program to offer. Second, perhaps high schools do not 
respond to changes in the law because they do not know what the 
law is. These possibilities have potentially different policy 
ramifications. 
If high schools do not care about tort liability when 
making decisions about sports offerings, then it makes little sense 
to enforce youth sports releases in hopes of increasing high school 
sports participation. However, if high schools are ignorant about 
the law, then perhaps enforcing releases still makes sense because 
high schools might respond to the law as hypothesized if only they 
had better information. Thus, if states sent a clearer signal 
favoring the enforcement of youth sports releases, high school 
sports participation might rise. 
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Those who favor enforcing youth sports releases may find 
this second possibility intriguing, but further reflection shows this 
situation is unlikely to exist. Although high schools may be 
ignorant of the law, they would remain ignorant only if they did 
not consider that knowledge important. Assume for the sake of 
discussion that high schools are ignorant of the law and that 
enforcing youth sports releases would materially affect the 
provision of sports opportunities. High schools in this position 
would surely try to find out whether releases signed by parents 
actually offered protection from liability, and they would probably 
succeed in shedding their ignorance. To start, public high schools 
have access to this information. If nothing else, governments 
employ lawyers who could provide the requested guidance. Even 
private high schools can easily get legal assistance, as they 
probably have ongoing relationships with lawyers to handle the 
various legal problems associated with operating a school. 
Moreover, if the enforceability of youth sports releases genuinely 
mattered to high schools, they could easily undertake collective 
action to stay informed about the law. For example, state high 
school athletic associations or entities like NFHS would probably 
track the law and inform their members about changes. 
The foregoing strongly implies that high schools do not 
consider the enforcement of youth sports releases materially 
important to the scope of their sports offerings. If high schools 
know the law and do not respond to it, then clearly the law matters 
little. And, if high schools are ignorant of the law and choose to 
remain that way, they probably do not consider the law important 
to their decision-making.  
The generalizability of these conclusions to youth sports 
at large depends on whether high schools are a good representative 
for other youth sports providers. On one hand, high schools may 
not respond to tort liability the way other sports providers do. 
Unlike for-profit or even nonprofit youth sports providers, high 
schools, especially public high schools, do not sell youth sports 
opportunities into a marketplace. Instead, high schools offer sports 
as one component of an integrated educational program. This, 
along with the strong probability that high schools carry liability 
insurance regardless of whether they offer sports, might render 
high schools relatively insensitive to concerns about tort liability 
when it comes to offering sports. Perhaps high schools consider 
sports an important part of their educational program which 
should be cut only as a matter of last resort. Just as liability 
concerns do not stop high schools from giving students 
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opportunities to conduct potentially dangerous chemistry 
experiments, those concerns might not prevent high schools from 
offering sports.72  
On the other hand, most youth sports providers and high 
schools could respond the same way to tort liability. If such 
liability poses the existential threat hypothesized by Zivich, 
Sharon, Hohe, and other decisions enforcing youth sports 
releases, those financial consequences should matter to both high 
schools and other sports providers.73 Moreover, if high schools are 
insensitive to changes in the law because they carry liability 
insurance, it is also likely other youth sports providers carry 
insurance. Thus, unless a significant percentage of youth sports 
providers do not carry coverage, or if the cost of that coverage is 
significantly cheaper for high schools, youth sports providers 
likely do not significantly alter what they offer in response to 
changes in the law.74 
Ideally, one would conduct another empirical 
investigation to see if other youth sports providers respond to tort 
liability as high schools do, but the authors could not find 
comprehensive sources of data. However, if other sports providers 
appear not to respond to the law concerning youth sport releases, 
it is likely that other providers do not consider tort liability a major 
                                                                                             
72 High schools are possibly also insensitive to tort liability 
because sovereign immunity or damages caps protect them. As noted 
earlier, we initially controlled for variations in state law related to these 
protections and found they did not affect the outcome of our study. 
73 Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998); 
Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002); Hohe v. San 
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1990). 
74  Enforceable waivers’ presence could theoretically affect 
insurance rates. However, insurance companies do not appear to offer 
discounts to entities that obtain waivers from participants. See SADLER 
SPORTS & RECREATION INSURANCE, https://www.sadlersports.com/
amateur/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (published quotes do not alter 
premium quoted on the basis of waivers, although quotes do vary by risk 
of brain injury); Quote, ESPORTSINSURANCE, https://quote.esports
insurance.com/Quote/Create?sport=29 (last visited, Sept. 19, 2020) 
(quotes offered by state appear not to vary on the basis of whether youth 
sports waivers are enforced). This matches the personal experience of 
one author, Yen, who participated in getting insurance to cover a youth 
soccer event. None of the insurance quotes depended on whether the 
event obtained waivers from participants even though the state where the 
event was held, Massachusetts, enforces youth sports releases. 
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factor in their decision making. This is because, like high schools, 
ordinary youth sports providers who consider it important have 
easy opportunities to learn about whether youth sports releases are 
enforceable. For example, many sports have national, state, and 
private governing bodies that could easily monitor the law and 
notify members about the enforceability of youth sports releases.75 
Those operating sports facilities also have associations that could 




States differ in the legal treatment of youth sports 
releases. Some enforce them, others do not, and still others have 
no clear law. Importantly, states disagree about the policy 
consequences of enforcing or not enforcing these releases. States 
refusing to enforce do so because they wish to guard against the 
social problems associated with uncompensated injuries suffered 
by youth athletes at the hands of negligent sports providers. States 
enforcing releases do so because they believe that enforcing 
releases lowers costs incurred by sports providers, resulting in 
                                                                                             
75  Examples include: U.S. YOUTH SOCCER, https://www.
usyouthsoccer.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (organized under 
auspices of U.S. Soccer and overseeing state governing associations); 
U.S. FIGURE SKATING, https://www.usfigureskating.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 19,2020) (national governing body of figure skating with 
individual club memberships); POP WARNER FOOTBALL, 
https://www.popwarner.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (nonprofit 
overseeing youth football and cheerleading opportunities at the local 
level); AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION, https://aausports.org/index.php (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2020) (nonprofit promoting amateur sports with 
membership for clubs and organizer of numerous youth competitions). 
76  Examples include the US INDOOR SPORTS ASS’N, 
https://usindoor.com/facilities/resources/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); 
U.S. ICE RINK ASS’N, https://www.usicerinks.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 
2020); WORLD WATERPARK ASS’N, https://waterparks.org/web/
wwa_show.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2020),; and SPORTSPLEX 
OPERATORS & DEVELOPERS ASS’N, https://www.sportsplex
operators.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).  
77  Examples include the AMERICAN FOOTBALL COACHES 
ASS’N, https://www.afca.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); NATIONAL 
GYMNASTICS COACHES ASS’N, https://gymca.org/98942656 (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2020); and UNITED SOCCER COACHES, https://unitedsoccer
coaches.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).  
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increased youth sports participation whose benefits outweigh the 
costs of uncompensated injuries. 
 The study reported in this Article tests whether the 
hypothesized benefit of increased youth sports participation exists 
in high school sports. The study finds no statistically significant 
relationship between enforcing youth sports releases and 
participation rates. This finding significantly weakens the case for 
enforcing youth sports releases. 
Of course, states have other reasons for enforcing youth 
sports releases. These possibilities include freedom of contract 
and respect for parental decisions made on behalf of minor 
children. The study of these possibilities lies outside the scope of 
this article, and courts enforcing youth sports releases have not 
relied heavily on these rationales for their decisions. Perhaps 
freedom of contract and respect for parental decision-making 
justify enforcement. However, this study questions whether the 
primary existing justification for such enforcement is true. We 
therefore believe that courts considering youth sports releases 
should hesitate before finding those releases enforceable. 
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APPENDIX: 
STATE LAW CONCERNING ENFORCEABILITY OF YOUTH 
SPORTS RELEASES 
 
This appendix describes the law relied on to assign legal 
codes for each state used in the study. Each entry provides the 







In 2010, the Middle District of Alabama decided J.T. ex 
rel. Thode v. Monster Mt., LLC and identified the enforceability 
of youth sports releases as an issue of first impression for the 
state.78 The case involved a negligence suit by a minor against a 
for-profit motocross park’s owner.79 In response, the defendants 
moved for summary judgment on the basis of a release signed by 
the minor’s parents.80 The court refused to enforce the release.81 
The court cited Alabama law suggesting that parents lack the 
ability to waive a child’s rights concerning personal injuries.82 
The court also incorrectly noted “the few cases that have upheld a 
pre-injury waiver have made a point of emphasizing that the 
policy reasons for doing so are based on the fact of the defendant 
being a nonprofit sponsor of the activity involved, such as with 
school extra-curriculars.”83 We decided to code this decision as a 
-1 because (1) it is a federal decision, and (2) although the court 
recognized that some states enforce youth sports releases in favor 
                                                                                             
78 Id. at 1326. J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC, 
754 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 2010). 
79 Id. at 1323—24. 
80 Id. at 1325. 
81 Id. at 1327. 
82 Id. at 1327—28. 
83 Id. at 1328. This statement appears to overlook cases in which 
for-profit entities had successfully asserted preinjury releases before 
2010. See Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 104 Cal. App. 4th 
1253, 1255 (2002); Vokes ex rel. Vokes v. Ski Ward, Inc., 2005 WL 
2009959 (2005); Quirk v. Walker’s Gymnastics & Dance, 16 Mass L. 
Rptr. 502 (2003).  
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of nonprofits and schools, its citation to Alabama law did not 
incorporate this distinction. The court likely used this recognition 
to build confidence in the case’s specific result and not to express 






In 2004, the state enacted Alaska General Statute 





We found no case law directly on point. Article 18, 
section 5 of the Arizona Constitution provides that assumption of 
risk is always a jury question, even if it is express contractual 
assumption of risk. 85  This does not affect the substantive 
enforceability of a youth sports release, although it appears to 





In the 1987 case Williams v. United States, the Eastern 
District of Arkansas considered a claim for personal injury 
suffered by a 16-year-old boy at an Air Force base swimming 
pool.86 The court held that a release form signed by the parent did 
not relieve the government of liability because it was “against the 
sound public policy of Arkansas.”87 
 
  
                                                                                             
84 ALASKA STAT. §09.65.292 (2004). 
85 ARIZ. CONST., Art. 18 §5 (providing “The defense of contributory 
negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a 
question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.”). 
86 Williams v. United States, 660 F.Supp. 699, 700 (E.D. Ark. 
1987). 
87 Id. at 703. 






California clarified its law in 1990 with Hohe v. San 
Diego Unified School District, in which an intermediate appellate 
court enforced a release signed by a student’s parent in favor of a 
public school.88  As noted in the main text, Hohe is a leading 







In 1997, the Tenth Circuit enforced a release favoiring a 
commercial entity in Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc.89 However, 
the opinion was not sufficient to merit a 1 because it did not 
directly opine on the question of releases signed by parents on 
behalf of minors and was issued by a federal, not state, court. In 
2002, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to enforce a release 
favoring a commercial entity on public policy grounds.90  The 
court cited Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, where the 
Washington Supreme Court held that parents lack the ability to 
waive their children’s rights preinjury.91 We therefore interpreted 
Cooper as moving Colorado to -2. However, this condition lasted 
one year. In 2003, the state enacted C.R.S. §13-22-107 which 
permits parental waivers.92 This changed the state’s coding to 2. 
                                                                                             
88 Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 3d 1559, 
1568 (1990). See also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 104 Cal. 
App. 4th 1253, 1255 (2002) (enforcing release in favor of commercial ski 
operator). 
89 Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th 
Cir. 1997). 
90 Cooper v. The Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002). 
91 Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992) (“to 
the extent a parent's release of a third party's liability for negligence 
purports to bar a child's own cause of action, it violates public policy and 
is unenforceable”). 
92 .COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-107(3) (“A parent of a child may, on behalf 
of the child, release or waive the child's prospective claim for 
 






In 1958, the Connecticut Superior Court refused to 
enforce a release in favor of the Boy Scouts of America in Fedor 
v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America. 93  We used this 
opinion to assign a -2 as of 1988. In 2002, the unpublished opinion 
in Fischer v. Rivest enforced a release in favor of USA Hockey, 
the Connecticut Hockey Conference, and the City of Norwich.94 
This case was followed by Saccente v. Laflamme, another 
unpublished opinion in which the Superior Court enforced a 
release. 95  Because Fischer was an unpublished opinion, we 
interpreted it as creating doubt about the state of the law, not an 
authoritative holding in favor of enforcement. We therefore 
assigned a 0. This uncertainty continued through 2004, when two 
other unpublished opinions from the Superior Court refused to 
enforce releases. 96  Then, in 2005, in Hanks v. Powder Ridge 
Restaurant Corp., the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected all 
exculpatory agreements as violating public policy.97 This resulted 
in a coding of -2. 
 
  
                                                                                             
negligence.”). See also .COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-107(1)(a)(VI) (“It is 
the intent of the general assembly to encourage the affordability and 
availability of youth activities in this state by permitting a parent of a 
child to release a prospective negligence claim of the child against 
certain persons and entities involved in providing the opportunity to 
participate in the activities.”). 
93 Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,143 
A.2d 466 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958). 
94 Id. at 1. Fischer v. Rivest, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 119, 2002 WL 
31126288, at *15 (Aug. 15, 2002). 
95  Saccente v. Laflamme, No. CV0100756730, 2003 WL 
21716586 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2003). 
96  Ehrenrich v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, No. 
CV030090988S, 2004 WL 3090681 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2004); 
Laliberte v. White Water Mountain Resorts, No. X07CV030083300S, 
2004 WL 1965868 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2004). 
97 Hankes v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 
741 (Conn. 2005). 





  We found no law on point. 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 
 1988-2014: 0 
  








Florida courts do not clearly answer whether they would 
enforce exculpatory agreements signed by parents in favor of high 
schools. In the 1998 case Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc., the 
Florida District Court of Appeal enforced a release in favor of a 
commercial entity without considering whether a guardian had 
authority to execute it. 98  Although this decision is logically 
consistent with enforcing such releases in favor of high schools, 
we assigned a 1 because consideration of the precise issue was too 
thin to provide adequate guidance. 
In the 2004 case Gonzalez v. City of Coral Gables,99 the 
Florida District Court of Appeal enforced a release in favor of a 
city after school program.100 In so ruling, it distinguished the city’s 
situation from commercial activities that could insure against loss. 
This implied that Florida law would no longer enforce releases 
favoring commercial entities, but would do so for releases 
favoring nonprofit or governmental entities.101 Because Gonzalez 
provided a more specific analysis of the precise issue being 
analyzed, we assigned a code of 2 beginning in 2004. 
                                                                                             
98 Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc. 717 So.2d 590, 590-92, (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
99 871 So.2d 1067 (FL 3d DCA 2004). 
100 Gonzalez v. City of Coral Gables, 871 So.2d 1067, 1067—
68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
101 Id. 
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Finally, in the 2008 case Kirton v. Fields, the Florida 
Supreme Court refused to enforce a parentally-signed release in 
favor of a commercial entity.102 However, the court explicitly left 
open what it would decide in a noncommercial activity case, even 
if the overall language of the opinion casts doubt on the 
enforceability of youth sports releases generally.103 We therefore 
interpreted Kirton as leaving the Gonzalez result intact, but in 










We found no law on point. Hawaii Statutes §663-1.54 
permits waivers, but is limited to releases involving “any person 
who owns or operates a business providing recreation activities to 
the public.”105 Thus, the statute does not affect releases favoring 
high schools. Additional complications concerning this statute are 





We found no law on point. 
                                                                                             
102 Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008). 
103 Id. at 350. 
104 We note, in 2010, Florida amended FLA STAT. §744.301(3) to read, 
“[N]atural guardians are authorized, on behalf of any of their minor 
children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action 
against a commercial activity provide . . . from an inherent risk in the 
activity.” FLA STAT. §744.301(3) (2020). This statute partially overrules 
Kirton, but it applies only to commercial activities, leaving open the 
question of how releases favoring government and nonprofit entities 
would be treated. Furthermore, because the statute permits releases only 
for risks “inherent” in an activity, it is unclear how the statute affects 
releases involving risks inherent in an activity but exacerbated by a 
sports provider’s negligence. 
105 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54 (2020). 
106 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
 







In 1994, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District 
decided Meyer v. Naperville Manner Inc.107 The case involved a 
minor injured in a horseback riding accident.108 The court held 
that parents lack the authority to release a child’s cause of action 







In the 2006 case of Stowers v. Clinton Cent. School Corp., 
the Indiana Court of Appeals appeared to consider releases signed 
by parents enforceable.110 In Stowers, the plaintiffs were parents 
suing for the wrongful death of their son, who collapsed during a 
high school football practice. 111  A jury found for the 
defendants.112 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the trial court erred 
by admitting a release form signed by the plaintiff’s mother. The 
release acknowledged the risks of playing football and held the 
defendants harmless of responsibility for injury.113 The plaintiffs 
further argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury that the release in question did not absolve the defendants of 
responsibility for negligence because the release had no language 
specifically referring to negligence. 114 The court ruled the trial 
court was in error. In so ruling, the court stated that Indiana public 
policy does not disfavor exculpatory agreements. However, 
                                                                                             
107 Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 414—15. 
110  Id. at 749. Stowers v. Clinton Cent. School Corp., 855 
N.E.2d 739, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
111 Id. at 743—44. 
112 Id. at 745. 
113 Id. at 748. 
114 Id. at 749—50. 
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because the release signed by the mother did not refer to 
negligence, it did not affect the case at hand.115 The court reversed 
and remanded for a new trial.116 
We interpreted Stowers as an ambiguous signal in favor 
of enforcing releases that merited a coding of 1. The court behaved 
as if a properly drafted release would be enforceable, but the 
release’s validity was not the issue litigated. The question was 
whether the release was admissible, and if so, in what form. This 
prevented us from concluding that Stowers established the 
enforceability of youth sports releases. 
A clearer signal arrived in 2012. In Wabash County Young 
Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc. v. Thompson, the minor plaintiff was 
injured during a softball game while sliding into second base.117 
In response, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that a release signed by the plaintiff’s mother released the 
defendant from liability. The release in question applied to “injury 
or medical expenses incurred while participating in practice or 
playing in a game,” and did not specifically refer to the 
defendant’s potential negligence.118 The Indiana Court of Appeals 
concluded that the release form was valid.119 Although the release 
did not mention the defendant’s possible negligence, the court 
found that the release still affected risks “inherent in the nature of 
the activity,” even if the defendant’s negligence exacerbated those 
risks.120 Thus, the release applied to the plaintiff’s claim because 
the risk of being injured while sliding into second base is part of 
softball.121 We interpreted this as a sufficiently clear signal that 
youth sports releases are enforceable and changed the code to 2. 
 
  
                                                                                             
115 Id. at 749. 
116 Id. at 749—50. The court also affirmed other rulings by the 
trial court not relevant to the enforceability of youth sports releases. 
117 Wabash Cty. Young Men’s Ass’n. Inc. v. Thompson, 975 
N.E.2d 362, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
118 Id. at 364. 
119 Id. at 366. 
120 Id. at 366—67.  
121 Id. at 367. 






In 2010, the Iowa Supreme Court held in Galloway v. 
State that “preinjury releases executed by parents purporting to 
waive the personal injury claims of their minor children violate 
public policy and are therefore unenforceable.”122 This changed 





We found no law on point. 
 
KENTUCKY: 
 1988-2014: 0 
 





In 1985, Louisiana passed Civil Code Article 2004, which 
provides, “Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits 
the liability of one party for intentional or gross fault that causes 
damage to the other party. Any clause is null that, in advance, 
excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing physical 
injury to the other party.” Therefore, Louisiana was coded as a -2 
for the entire study.123 
 
  
                                                                                             
122 Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Iowa 2010). 
123 See Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So.2d 811 (La. 
1991) (interpreting Article 2004 as invalidating preinjury waivers 
generally). 




In Doyle v. Bowdoin College, the court mentioned in a 
footnote that a parent cannot release a child’s cause for action.124 
Rice v. American Skiing Co. confirmed this understanding of 
Maine law in 2000.125 Therefore, Maine is coded as a -2 for the 






In 2013, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Rosen dealt with the 
enforceability of an exculpatory clause executed by a child’s 
parent for the purpose of getting the child access to a play structure 
at a BJ’s Wholesale Club.126 The Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that the release was enforceable and rejected any distinction 
between for-profit and nonprofit entities.127 Therefore, Maryland 






In the 2002 case Sharon v. City of Newton, a student was 
injured during cheerleading practice, and the student’s parent had 
signed a waiver releasing liability on the student’s behalf.128 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court enforced the release, 
                                                                                             
124 Doyle v Bowdoin College, Me., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me. 
1979). 
125  See Rice v. American Skiing Co., No. Civ.A.CV-99-06, 
2000 WL 33677027, at 4* (Me. Super. Ct. May 8, 2000). 
126 BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Rosen, 80 A.3d 345, 346 (Md. 
2013). 
127 Id. at 359 (“The distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
entities, however, is without support in our jurisprudence; we have 
upheld the legitimacy of exculpatory agreements in commercial settings 
against adults and the policy arguments upon which we have validated 
or invalidated exculpatory clauses know no such distinction.”). 
128  Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Mass. 
2002). 
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writing, “To hold that releases of the type in question here are 
unenforceable would expose public schools, who offer many of 
the extracurricular sports opportunities available to children, to 
financial costs and risks that will inevitably lead to the reduction 
of those programs.”129 Therefore, Massachusetts is coded as a 2 






In 2010, Woodman ex rel. Woodman v. Kera LLC held 
that a liability waiver signed by a father on his child’s behalf is 
unenforceable. 130  This changed Michigan’s coding to -2 






In Moore v. Minnesota Baseball Instructional School, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals enforced a youth sports release.131 
The opinion was unpublished so its weight is questionable. 





We did not find law directly on point. However, in Quinn 
v. Mississippi State University,132 the Mississippi Supreme Court 
encountered a release signed by a parent but did not directly rule 
on the issue. Instead, the court held that the plaintiff’s tort claim 
was barred by both sovereign and qualified immunity.133  The 
                                                                                             
129 Id. at 109—10.  
130Woodman ex rel. Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mich. 
2010) (“[T]he Michigan common law rule is clear: a guardian, including 
a parent, cannot contractually bind his minor ward.”). 
131 Moore v. Minn. Baseball Instructional Sch., No. A08–0845, 
2009 WL 818738, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009). 
132 Quinn v. Miss. State Univ., 720 So.2d 843 (Miss. 1998). 
133 Id. at 852. 
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court held that the release was relevant only to the plaintiff’s 
breach of implied contract action.134 We did not interpret this case 
as making a sufficiently clear statement about enforceability of 











Montana’s operative law was largely statutory. In 1895, 
the state enacted MT Statutes § 28-2-702, providing that contracts 
exempting a person from responsibility for “fraud, for willful 
injury to the person or property of another, or for violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”135 
This language suggests that youth sports releases are 
unenforceable. Indeed, in 1986, the Montana Supreme Court 
interpreted §28-2-702 to apply only to: “(1) fraud; (2) willful 
injury to the property or person of another; (3) negligent or willful 
violation of law.” 136  The term “violation of law” included 
breaches of statutes, constitutions, case law, and common law, 
making the statute apply to releases of common law negligence.137 
Thus, Montana was coded as -2 at the start of the study period. 
In 2009, Montana enacted MT ST 27-1-753. This statute 
allowed “a written waiver or release entered into prior to engaging 
in a sport or recreational opportunity for damages or injuries 
resulting from conduct that constitutes ordinary negligence or for 
risks that are inherent in the sport or recreational opportunity.” 
However, these waivers could still be challenged “on any legal 
grounds.” 138  This language apparently supersedes §28-2-702’s 
blanket prohibition against sports releases. However, no case has 
used this provision to enforce a release. Furthermore, we did not 
know whether the Montana Supreme Court would find youth 
                                                                                             
134 Id. 
135 MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (West 2020) (enacted 1895). 
136 Miller v. Fallon Cnty, 721 P.2d 342, 346 (Mont. 1986). 
137 Id. 
138 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-753(3)(d) (West 2020). 
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sports releases signed by parents problematic. Accordingly, we 
coded Montana as a 0 starting in 2009. 
 
NEBRASKA: 
 1988-2014: 0 
 











We found no law directly on point from 1988 through 
2013. In 2014, a Massachusetts federal district court interpreted 
New Hampshire law as not enforcing youth sports releases.139 We 






In Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,141 a New 
Jersey Superior Court held that a parent cannot waive a child’s tort 
claim in advance. 142  Here, the father signed a release as a 
condition to allow his infant son to go on a trip sponsored by the 
                                                                                             
139 Harrigan v. New England Dragway, Inc., No. CV 13-10132-
JCB, 2014 WL 12589625, at *6 (W.D. MA Jan. 2, 2014) (stating no 
controlling authority exists on the whether a parent can bind a child to 
an exculpatory agreement). 
140 In 2017, after the study period, a New Hampshire Superior 
Court opinion found youth sports releases unenforceable. See Perry v. 
SNH Dev., No. 2015-CV-00678, 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32, at *16 
(Sept. 13, 2017). 
141 Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.1970). 
142 Id. at 108.  
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defendant.143 The court found this agreement void against public 
policy.144 New Jersey was therefore coded as -2 at the beginning 
of the study.  
 In the 2006 case of Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,145 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a parent cannot bind a minor 
child to a preinjury waiver of liability.146 The court framed the 
issue somewhat narrowly, especially given Fitzgerald, as 
“whether New Jersey's public policy permits a parent to release a 
minor child's potential tort claims arising out of the minor's use of 
a commercial recreational facility.”147  This left open what the 
court might have decided if the defendant had been a non-profit 
or government entity. Granted, the language and rationale of the 
opinion suggest that the non-profit situation would be handled the 
same way. But to be conservative, we coded New Jersey as -1 










In the 1978 case of Santangelo v. City of New York,148 the 
Supreme Court refused to bind a child to a release signed by the 
child’s father in suit against the Greater New York City Ice 
Hockey League, Inc. This decision was reinforced in Alexander v. 
Kendall Cent. School Dist., where the Supreme Court stated “a 
minor is not bound by a release executed by his parent.”149 We 
                                                                                             
143 Id. at 105—06. 
144 Id. at 107—08. 
145 Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006). 
146 Id. at 383 (“a parent may not bind a minor child to a pre-
injury release of a minor’s prospective tort claims resulting from the 
minor’s use of a commercial recreational facility.”). 
147 Id. at 386. 
148 Santangelo v. City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. 
Div. 2nd Dept. 1978). 
149  Id. at 897. Alexander v. Kendall Cent. Sch. Dist., 221 
A.D.2d 898 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1995). 
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In 2011, the Eastern District of North Carolina enforced a 
waiver in favor of a Navy Junior ROTC program.150 The court 
identified no controlling precedent and stated that parents 
generally lacked the power to bind their children to exculpatory 
agreements. 151  However, the court considered school or 
community programs different and enforced the release.152 We 






In the 2003 case of Kondrad v. Bismarck Park District, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court enforced a release signed by a 
child’s mother for an after-school care program operated by the 
Bismarck Park District.153 We therefore coded North Dakota as 2 






In 1998, the leading case Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club 
enforced a release signed by a mother in in favor of a nonprofit 
soccer club.154 This resulted in our assigning a code of 2 beginning 
in 1998. 
                                                                                             
150 Kelly v. U.S., 809 F.Supp.2d 429 (E.D. N.C. 2011). 
151 Id. at 435—47 (“The parties agree that there is no controlling 
precedent.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Kondrad ex rel. v. Bismarck Park District, 655 N.W.2d 411 
(N.D. 2003). 
154 Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 
1998). 
 




 We found no law directly on point.155  
 
OREGON: 
 1988-2014: 0 
 
 Oregon did not clarify its law concerning releases until 
the study period’s end. In Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., the Oregon 
Supreme Court held an anticipatory release unenforceable as a 
violation of public policy and unconscionable.156 This case was 
decided on December 18, 2014, a date so late that it could not have 
affected behavior during the study period. We therefore left 
Oregon coded as 0. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA: 
 1988-1997: -1 
 1998-2014: -2 
  
 In the 1987 case Simmons by Grenell v. Parkette Nat’l 
Gymnastic Training Center, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
refused to enforce a release signed by a parent in favor of a gym.157 
This made Pennsylvania a -1 at the study period’s beginning. In 
the 1998 case Shaner v. State System of Higher Ed., the Court of 
Common Pleas adopted Simmons, stating “[u]nder Pennsylvania 
law, parents do not possess the authority to release the claims or 
potential claims of a minor child merely because of the parental 
relationship.”158 This changed the state to -2. 
 
  
                                                                                             
155 One year after the study, the Western District of Oklahoma 
predicted that Oklahoma courts would not enforce exculpatory 
agreements for children signed by parents. See Holly Wethington v. 
Swainson, 155 F.Supp.3d 1173 (W.D. Ok. 2015). 
156 Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 30 (Or. 2014). 
157 Simmons v. Parkette Nat’l Gymnastic Training Center, 670 
F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
158 Shaner v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 40 Pa. D. & C.4th 308, 
312—13 (Com. Pl. 1998), aff’d, 738 A.2d 535 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
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RHODE ISLAND: 
 1988-2014: 0 
  
 Rhode Island law on youth sports releases is unclear. In 
the 1978 products liability case Julian v. Zayre Corp., the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court cited to RI G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) 
§ 33-15-1(a), which provided releases by parents are valid if under 
$1,000.159 This statute was amended in 1992 to apply to releases 
up to $10,000.160 The statute’s language is unclear because the 
dollar figure’s existence implies that the claimant’s injury already 
occurred and can be valued. If a court were to agree, the provision 
could not apply to youth sports releases executed before injury. 
We could not find case law clarifying this ambiguity or ruling on 
youth sports releases’ enforceability. Therefore, Rhode Island is 










  We found no law directly on point.  
 
TENNESSEE: 
 1988: 0 
 1989-2014: -2 
  
 In the 1989 case Childress v. Madison County, the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals refused to enforce a release signed by 
the plaintiff’s mother.161 The plaintiff was twenty-years-old and 
                                                                                             
159 Julian v. Zayre Corp., 388 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1978). 
160 R.I. GEN. LAWS §33-15.1-1(b) (“A release given by both parents or 
by a parent or guardian who has the legal custody of a minor child or by 
a guardian or adult spouse of a minor spouse shall, where the amount of 
the release does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in value, be 
valid and binding upon the minor.”). 
161 Id. at 6-8. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 708 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“The law is clear that a guardian cannot on behalf 
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suffered from a developmental disability.162 The court considered 
him the equivalent of a child, writing, “The law is clear that a 
guardian cannot on behalf of an infant or incompetent, exculpate 
or indemnify against liability those organizations which sponsor 
activities for children and the mentally disabled.”163 Therefore, 
Tennessee is coded as a -2 beginning in 1989.164 
 
TEXAS: 
 1988-1992: 0 
 1993-2014: -2 
  
 In the 1993 case Munoz v. II Jaz, Inc., the Texas Court of 
Appeals held parents do not have authority to waive their 
children’s claims. 165  The plaintiff was a child injured at an 
amusement park after her older sister had signed a release.166 The 
court resolved the case by deciding that, even if the older sister 
had the legal authority to sign on behalf of the parents, the parents 
lacked the authority to waive the child’s claims.167 We therefore 
changed Texas’ coding to 2. 
  
                                                                                             
of an infant or incompetent, exculpate or indemnify against liability 
those organizations which sponsor activities for children and the 
mentally disabled.”). See also Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber 
of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing 
Childress with approval); Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville 
Operations, LLC, 523 S.W.3d. 624, 632 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (re-
affirming Childress and noting difference between Tennessee law and 
California law). 
162 Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 2.  
163 Id. at 7—8. 
164  See also Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of 
Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Childress 
with approval); Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, 
LLC, 523 S.W.3d. 624, 632 (Tenn. C.t App. 2017) (reaffirming 
Childress and noting difference between Tennessee law and California 
law). 
165  Munoz v. II Jaz, Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. App. 
1993). 
166 Id. at 208. 
167 Id. at 209—10. 
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UTAH: 
 1988-2000: 0 
 2001-2014: -2 
 
 In the 2001 case Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins v. Peart, the 
Utah Supreme Court considered an eleven-year-old child’s action 
for injuries suffered in a horseback riding accident.168 The court 
ruled a waiver signed by the child’s mother unenforceable, 
writing, “a parent has [no] authority to release a child's cause of 
action prior to an injury."169 Therefore, we changed Utah’s coding 
to -2 in 2001. 
 
VERMONT: 
 1988-2014: 0 
 
 We found no law directly on point. 
 
VIRGINIA: 
 1988-1991: 0 
 1992-2014: -2 
  
 Before 1992, Virginia law exhibited conflicts that 
prevented us from determining the law governing youth sports 
releases. In the 1890 case Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond and 
Danville R.R. Co., the Virginia Supreme Court refused to enforce 
an adult’s apparent liability waiver in favor of a railroad 
company.170 However, in the 1977 case Barnes v. Crysal Plaza, 
the Virginia Circuit Court enforced a release signed by an adult in 
favor of an amusement facility, while recognizing that 
exculpatory agreements involving “infants” might be treated 
differently.171 Therefore, we coded Virginia as 0 to start. 
 In the 1992 case Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass’n, 
Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court held an adult’s preinjury release 
                                                                                             
168 Id. at 1063—64. 
169 Id. at 1066 (quoting Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 
P.2d 6, 10—12 (Wash. 1992)). 
170 Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 11 S.E. 829 (Va. 
1890).  
171 Id. Barnes v. Crysal Plaza, 11 Va. Cir. 442 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
1977). 
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void because it was against public policy. 172  The court cited 
Johnson’s Adm’x favorably and stated the law had not changed.173 
We therefore changed Virginia’s coding to -2 in 1992. 
 Hiett is weakened somewhat in Elswick v. Lonesome Pine 
International Raceway, where the Virginia Circuit Court of 
Appeals enforced a release in the context of auto racing because 
auto racing is an inherently dangerous activity.174 However, we 
did not think this was enough to change the effect of Hiett overall.  
 
WASHINGTON: 
 1988-2014: -2 
 
 In the 1988 case Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., parents 
sued to invalidate waivers public school districts required them to 
sign for their children to play sports.175 The Washington Supreme 
Court ruled the waivers unenforceable because they violated 
public policy. 176  Because Wagenblast applies directly to high 
schools, we coded Washington as -2 for the entire study period. In 
1992, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, 
strengthened the Wagenblast result in the leading case Scott v. 




 1988-2003: 0 
 2004-2014: -1 
 
 In the 2004 case Johnson v. New River Scenic Whitewater 
Tours, the Southern District of West Virginia considered a 
wrongful death action on behalf of 14-year-old girl.178 The court 
                                                                                             
172 Id. Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 896 
(Va. 1992). 
173 Id. 
174 Elswick v. Lonesome Pine Int’l Raceway, Inc., No. L99-89, 
2001 WL 1262224, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 2001). 
175 Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 969 (Wash. 
1988). 
176 Id. at 975. 
177  See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-21 and 
accompanying text. 
178  Johnson v. New River Scenic Whitewater Tours, 313 
F.Supp.2d 621, 623-24 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). 
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held a release signed by chaperone on a rafting trip unenforceable 
under the provisions of a statute that applied specifically to 
rafting.179 The court considered whether a parent could agree to 
indemnify a defendant for damages resulting from negligent 
injury to a child, concluding West Virginia courts would not 
enforce such agreements.180 Although this case does not hold all 
youth sports releases unenforceable, we thought its language and 
tenor was enough to change West Virginia’s coding to -1. 
 
WISCONSIN: 
 1988-1995: 0 
 1996-2014: -1 
  
Wisconsin was difficult to code. Before 1996, no case law 
about enforcing youth sports releases existed. In 1996, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, 
Inc.181 Yauger involved awrongful death action brought by the 
parents of an eleven-year-old girl who died in a skiing accident.182 
In its defense, the defendant claimed that a release signed by the 
decedent’s father barred any claim. 183  The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs 
appealed.184 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court identified a 
single issue, public policy, and it refused to enforce the agreement 
because it did not sufficiently signal that the defendant waived 
negligence.185 The court did not consider whether parents had the 
legal authority to waive tort claims on behalf of their children. 
 Yauger can be read to affect only the proper drafting of 
releases. This interpretation implies that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court would have enforced the agreement in Yauger if the release 
had contained clearer language. However, prior case law about the 
enforceability of exculpatory agreements creates the impression 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reluctant to enforce such 
                                                                                             
179 Id. at 627—28.  
180 Id. at 631—33. 
181  Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Wis. 
1996). 
182 Id. at 61. 
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 63. 
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agreements, even when the agreements appear to waive 
negligence.186 
 Thus, we decided that Yauger, along with other 
Wisconsin case law, indicated a lean against enforcing 
exculpatory agreements, including youth sports releases. We 
therefore changed Wisconsin to a -1 starting with 1996. And 
indeed, in the 2005 case Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness 
Center, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again refused to enforce a 
release even though it stated that the decedent agreed “to assume 
all liability for myself without regard to fault.”187 
 
WYOMING: 
 1988-2014: 0 
 




                                                                                             
186 See Arnold v. Shawano Cnty. Agr. Soc., 330 N.W.2d 773, 
779 (Wis. 1983) (showing where an exculpatory agreement might be 
unenforceable even though it specifically waived negligence), overruled 
on other grounds by Green Springs Farms v. Kerston, 401 N.W.2d 816, 
821 (Wis. 1987); Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Wis. 
1994) (showing an exculpatory agreement unenforceable for reasons of 
public policy even though court believed the contract waived 
negligence). 
187 Atkins v, Swimwest Family Fitness, 691 N.W.2d 334, 340 
(Wis. 2005). There is one Court of Appeals decision refusing to enforce 
a youth sports release, but it is unpublished. See Osborn v. Cascade 
Mountain, Inc., 259 Wis.2d 481 (App. Ct. Wis. 2002) (exculpatory 
agreement signed by parent enforceable). Given the contrary leanings of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the unpublished status of this opinion, 
we chose not to give it weight in our analysis of state law. 
